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A Note on In fo rma t ion  Value Theory f o r  Experiments  
Defined i n  Ex tens ive  Form 
J e a n - P i e r r e  Ponssard* 
A b s t r a c t  
An experiment  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  a  random v a r i a b l e  which 
may t a k e  some p o s t e r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  a  marg ina l  p r o b a b i l i t y .  Elementary p r o p e r t i e s  of t h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n fo rma t ion  va lue  t ,heory a r e  d e r i v e d  
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The concept  o f t h e  va lue  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  one o f  t h e  
c o r n e r s t o n e s  o f  Dec i s ion  Ana lys i s  [2, 31. It i s  o r d i n a r i l y  
p r e s e n t e d  a s  a  consequence o f  Bayesl theorem. Now, exper iments  
may indeed  be  p r e s e n t e d  i n  terms o f  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  
t h u s  t h e  use  of  Bayesl  theorem, o r  d i r e c t l y  a s  a random v a r i a b l e  
which may t a k e  some p o s t e r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  acco rd ing  
t o  a  marg ina l  p r o b a b i l i t y .  Equiva lence  between t h e  two approaches 
has  l o n g  been r ecogn ized  i n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  l i t e r a t u r e  ( s e e  111 1; 
however t h e  second approach does no t  seem t o  have a t t r a c t e d  much 
t h e o r e t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  from d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s ~ s  i n  s p i t e  o f  some 
p r a c t i c a l  advan tages  ( s e e  example 1 . 4 . 3  i n  [ 4 ] ) .  
The o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h e  paper  i s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  some- e l emen ta ry  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h i s  second d e f i n i t i o n  of  expe r imen t s  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  va lue  t h e o r y .  The p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f -  
i cance  o f  t h e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  i s  a l s o  s t u d i e d .  
*on l e a v e  from t h e  Cen t r e  dlEnseignement  s u p e r i e u r  du 
Management P u b l i c ,  94112, A r c u e i l ,  and from Group de Ges t ion  
des O r g a n i s a t i o n s  Eco le  Po ly t echn ique ,  75005, P a r i s ,  France ;  
r e s e a r c h  s c h o l a r  a t  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Appl ied  
Systems A n a l y s i s ,  Laxenburg, A u s t r i a .  
The a u t h o r  w i shes  t o  exp res s  h i s  thanks  t o  Ralph Keeney, 
Howard Rai f f a ,  and Rober t  Winkler f o r  many h e l p f u l  d i s c u s s i o n s  
on a p r e l i m i n a r y  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  pape r .  
2 .  The Value o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  R e v i s i t e d  
2 . 1  D e f i n i t i o n s  
Let  us f i rs t  d e f i n e  what s h a l l  be  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem. 
D e f i n i t i o n  2 . 1 . 1 .  The c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem c o n s i s t s  
of  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  a n  a c t i o n  among a s e t  o f  f e a s i b l e  a c t i o n s  
A { a )  g i v e n  a  s e t  o f  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e s  o f  n a t u r e  S  = I s ) ,  a  
p r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on S,  
and a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  u  ( * , * )  d e f i n e d  on AxS, w i t h  v a l u e s  on 
t h e  r e a l  l i n e .  ( A  and S  a r e  assumed f i n i t e . )  
Exper iments  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  c l a s s i c a l  problem may now 
be  d e f i n e d  i n  two a l t e r n a t i v e  ways. 
D e f i n i t i o n  2 .1 .2 .  An exper iment  E ,  d e f i n e d  i n  normal form, 
c o n s i s t s  o f  a f i n i t e  s e t  o f  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s  E  = { e )  and a  m a t r i x  
o f  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  Q = {qes = Prob  el^^^^^^, S E S .  
D e f i n i t i o n  2.1.3. .  An exper iment  E, d e f i n e d  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form, 
c o n s i s t s  o f  a f i n i t e  s e t  o f  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t s  E = { e l ,  a s e t  o f  
p o s t e r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  on S,{pe = {Pz)sES)eEE,  and 
a  marg ina l  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  on E, 
which s a t i s f y  f o r  a l l  S E S ,  
Both d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  one may go 
from one t o  t h e  o t h e r  by means o f  Bayes'  theorem. 
A c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem and an experiment  f o r  t h i s  
problem g e n e r a t e  what might be  c a l l e d  a  "de r ived  problem" 
( s e e  Chapter  6 i n  [5] ),  i n  which one i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  s e l e c t i n g  
t h e  b e s t  s t r a t e g y ,  namely an a c t i o n  f o r  each  p o s s i b l e  e v e n t .  
Comparing c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t s  i n  bo th  problems and t h e  c o s t  
o f  t h e  expe r imen t ,  one t h e n  d e c i d e s  whether  o r  n o t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  
t h e  exper iment .  These p r a c t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  l e a d  t o  t h e  
concept  of  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  Le t  
P  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  on S. 
For  a l l  PEP,  l e t  u* ( 9 )  be  t h e  maximal expec ted  u t i l i t y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem, t h a t  i s :  
f o r  a l l  pep,  u * ( p )  = Max ~ ' u ( a , s )  . 
~ E A  s e S  
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 1 . 4 ,  The expec ted  va lue  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  EVI, 
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  an  experiment  E d e f i n e d  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form may 
be  e x p r e s s e d  a s  
P r o o f .  T h i s  i s  a s t a n d a r d  r e s u l t  i n  Dec i s ion  Ana lys i s .  
Assuming a l i n e a r  u t i l i t y  f o r  money, t h e  E V I  may be  
i n t e r p r e t e d  as t h e  maximal p r i c e  a t  which one s h o u l d  be 
w i l l i n g  t o  buy t h e  exper iment .  
2 .2  j 
Denote by PE t h e  s m a l l e s t  convex s u b s e t  o f  P which c o n t a i n s  
t h e  v e c t o r s  {pe leEE and f o r  any r e a l  va lued  con t inuous  f u n c t i o n  
f  ( 0 )  on P ,  l e t  Cav f  ( 0 )  be t h e  minimal concave f u n c t i o n *  
P~ 
g r e a t e r  o r  e q u a l  t o  f ( * )  on PE- Le t  E V I  ( p O I ~ )  be  t h e  expec ted  
v a l u e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  
problem and an  experiment  E d e f i n e d  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 .2 .1 .  
P r o o f .  S ince  u* ( 0 )  i s  a  convex f u n c t i o n  on P as b e i n g  t h e  p o i n t  
wise  maximum of  a s e t  o f  hype rp l anes ,  i t s  c o n c a v i f i c a t i o n  
depends on ly  on t h e  v a l u e s  t a k e n  on t h e  boundary o f  PE, t h e  
c o n c a v i f i c a t i o n  o f  which i n  t u r n s ,  depends on ly  on t h e  va lues  I 
t a k e n  on {pe leEE.  Denote by 
t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  some X O E A  such  t h a t  
* g(  * )  i s  a  concave f u n c t i o n  on P i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  a l l  
p1 and p2 i n  P and a l l  A&(0 ,1 ) :  
g ( l p l  + (1 -Alp2)  2 Xg(p1) + (1 - 1 ) g ( p 2 )  . 
and f o r  a l l  A E A ,  I: Aeu*(pe) 1 1 Aeu*(pe) . 
~ E E  ~ E E  
By d e f i n i t i o n  2 . 1 . 3  ??'EA, hence  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  h o l d s .  I 1 
We s h a l l  now c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t s  f o r  which ( 2 . 2 . 1 )  
i s  i n  g e n e r a l  a n  e q u a l i t y .  De f ine  t h e  P - c l a s s  o f  c l a s s i c a l  
d e c i s i o n  prob lems  as a l l  prob lems  f o r  which S  and  po i n  P  
remain  f i x e d  whereas  A and ~ ( 0 : - )  a r e  a l l o w e d  t o  v a r y .  
D e f i n i t i o n  2 . 2 . 2 .  The expe r imen t  E  i s  s a i d  t o  be  e f f i c i e n t  
if and o n l y  i f  ( 2 . 2 . 1 )  i s  an  e q u a l i t y  f o r  a l l  prob lems  i n  t h e  
P - c l a s s .  
Note t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  mean ing fu l  s i n c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  
d e f i n e  a n  expe r imen t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem 
we need on ly  know S  and po, t h a t  i s ,  t h e  P - c l a s s .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 2 . 3 .  An expe r imen t  E, d e f i n e d  i n  e x t e n s i v e  
form, i s  e f f i c i e n t  i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e  v e c t o r s  {pe l eEE  a r e  
l i n e a r l y  i n d e p e n d e n t .  
P r o o f .  Assume t h a t  E i s  i n e f f i c i e n t  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a c l a s s -  
i c a l  d e c i s i o n  prob lem i n  t h e  P - c l a s s  s u c h  t h a t  ( 2 . 2 . 1 )  i s  a 
s t r i c t  i n e q u a l i t y .  Hence t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  A 0  i n  A d e f i n e d  i n  
p r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 2 . 1  and A*, which i s  a l s o  i n  A ,  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  
S u b t r a c t i n g  I: A:Pe = po and  I: Pep, = po, we o b t a i n  a  l i n e a r  
e  EE ecE 
dependence r e l a t i o n  be tween  t h e  {pelecE. 
R e c i p r o c a l l y ,  s i n c e  po b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  convex h u l l  o f  
{pe l eEE  i t  may b e  e x p r e s s e d  as a convex combina t i on  o f  l i n e a r l y  
i ndependen t  v e c t o r s  {pe leeE ( u s i n g  C a r a t h e o d o r y ' s  t h e o r e m ) ,  s o  
t h a t  i f  t h e  s e t  {pe l ecE  i s  l i n e a r l y  dependen t ,  -4 c o n t a i n s  a t  
l e a s t  two p o i n t s .  It i s  now a  s imple  m a t t e r  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a 
c l a s s i c a l  d e c i s i o n  problem f o r  which ( 2 . 2 . 1 )  i s  a s t r i c t  
i n e q u a l i t y .  I I 
C o r o l l a r y  2 . 2 . 4 .  An experiment  d e f i n e d  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form, 
i s  i n e f f i c i e n t  if and on ly  i f  a t  l e a s t  one o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  h o l d  
( i )  t h e r e  e x i s t s  some el€E such t h a t  p  e  1 'E - { e l l 3  
(ii) t h e r e  a r e  more p o i n t s  i n  E t h a n  i n  S. 
Proof .  Th i s  i s  a n  immediate e q u i v a l e n c e  o f  t h e  l i n e a r  dependency 
o f  t h e  v e c t o r s  {P,} , ,~ .  I I 
A t y p i c a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h e  
c a s e  i n  which f o r  some e1€E, = po. Then i t  i s  i n t u i t i v e  
t h a t  t h e  experiment  i s  i n e f f i c i e n t  s i n c e  we may very well end 
up wi th  t h e  same p o s t e r i o r  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s  o u r  
p r i o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I f  pe i s  no t  t o o  d i f f e r e n t  from po t h e n  
1 
t h e  experiment  w i l l  remain i n e f f i c i e n t .  How c l o s e  i t  has  t o  
be f o r  i n e f f i c i e n c y  i s  made p r e c i s e  by t h e  c o r o l l a r y .  
The second c o n d i t i o n  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t .  
E s s e n t i a l l y  i t  i s  a q u e s t i o n  o f  d i m e n s i o n a l i t y  brought  i n  by 
t h e  f i n i t e n e s s  o f  t h e  s e t  S. 
E v e n t u a l l y ,  expe r imen t s  should  b e  compared i n  te rms  of  
EVI1s .  Th i s  comparison i s  e a s i l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  
exper iments  s i n c e  t h e n  t h e y  may be p a r t i a l l y  o r d e r e d  indepen-  
d e n t l y  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  d e c i s i o n  problem i n  t h e  P - c l a s s .  
D e f i n i t i o n  2 .2 .5 .  An exper iment  El i s  s a i d  t o  be more 
i n f o r m a t i v e  t h a n  an  exper iment  E2 i f  and on ly  i f  f o r  a l l  
problems i n  t h e  P -c l a s s ,  
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 .2 .6 .  For  an  e f f i c i e n t  exper iment  El t o  
be more i n f o r m a t i v e  t h a n  a n  exper iment  E2, a  n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h a t  P  C P  . 
E2 1 
P r o o f .  A s  a  s imp le  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  Cav o p e r a t o r ,  P  C PE E2 1 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
Cav f (po l  5 Cav f (po l  
P ~ 2  P ~ l  
f o r  a l l  convex f u n c t i o n s  f ( - )  on P. S ince  ( 2 . 3 . 1 )  i s  a n  
e q u a l i t y  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  expe r imen t s  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  f o l l o w s .  1 )  
We s h a l l  conc lude  t h i s  s e c t i o n  showing how t h e  comparison 
of  expe r imen t s  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e i r  comparison 
i n  normal form. The p a r a l l e l  o f  t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  w i t h  B lackwe l l  
and G i r s h i c k  s s t u d y  on t h e  s u b j e c t  [ 1 1 w i l l  become a p p a r e n t .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 .2 .7 .  For  any exper iment  E, t h e  v e c t o r s  
{pe l eEE  a r e  l i n e a r l y  independent  i f  and on ly  i f  t h e  v e c t o r s  
1 (qle = (qes ) ~ E S  ~ E E  a r e  l i n e a r l y  i ndependen t .  
6 P r o o f .  Denote by R t h e  m a t r i x  ( P , ) , ~ ~ , , , ~  and by T  t h e  m a t r i x  
s 
' tz 'eEE,sEs i n  which t: = p e / l e  f o r  a l l  ( e , s )  i n  ExS. 
According t o  Bayes theorem qes = tEpE. S i n c e  f o r  a l l  ( e , s )  
* 
i n  ExS A e  > 0 and ps > 0 ,  t h e  v e c t o r s  {pelecE 0 a r e  i ndependen t  
if and o n l y  i f  t h e  v e c t o r s ' { t e l e c E  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  and t h e  
v e c t o r s { t e l e E E  a r e  i ndependen t  i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e  v e c t o r s  
' q e ' e c ~  a r e  i n d e p e n d e n t .  I 1 
We may t h u s  r e p l a c e  t h e  s e t  {peleEE by t h e  s e t  {qelecE 
i n  o u r  deve lopment .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r  we o b t a i n  t h a t  a n  expe r imen t  
E i s  more i n f o r m a t i v e  t h a n  a n  exper iment  E2 i f  t h e  v e c t o r s  1 
Iqe'ecE2 are l i n e a r l y  dependent  on  t h e  v e c t o r s  {qeleEE1. 
T h i s  r e s u l t  was d e r i v e d  d i r e c t l y  by B lackwe l l  and G i r s h i c k  f o r  
expe r imen t s  i n  normal  form, hence  t h e  e q u i v a l e n a e  o f  t h e  two 
a p p r o a c h e s .  
3. P r a c t i c a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s  
The s t u d y  o f  expe r imen t s  i n  e x t e n s i v e  form l e a d s  u s  t o  t h e  
d e r i v a t i o n  o f  some e l emen ta ry  p r o p e r t i e s .  These p r o p e r t i e s  
may now b e  used  t o  somewhat s i m p l i f y  t h e  d e c i s i o n  a n a l y s i s  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ways: 
(i > If one h a s  t o  s e l e c t  one and  o n l y  one expe r imen t  
from a  g i v e n  s e t  o f  e q u a l l y  c o s t l y  e x p e r i m e n t s ,  t h e n  
p r o p o s i t i o n  2 .2 .6  may be  u sed  as a dominance c r i t e r i o n  
( s e e  s e c t i o n  6-4 i n  [5] f o r  g e n e r a l  comments on  t h e  
s u b j e c t )  t o  d e l e t e  l e s s  i n f o r m a t i v e  expe r imen t s .  
( i i )  If one h a s  t o  d e s i g n  a n  expe r imen t ,  t h e n  e f f i c i e n t  
expe r imen t s  have c l e a r l y  some a d v a n t a g e s  ( i n  
p r i n c i p l e  one may " r e d e s i g n "  a n  i n e f f i c i e n t  expe r imen t  
s o  as t o  o b t a i n  a n  e f f i c i e n t  one by mod i fy ing  t h e  
t h e  marg ina l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ) , a n d  t h e n  c o r o l l a r y  2 .2 .4  
o f f e r s  g u i d e l i n e s .  Moreover t h e  marg ina l  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  need n o t  be  s p e c i f i e d  f o r  e f f i c i e n t  
expe r imen t s  s i n c e  i t  i s  un ique ly  de t e rmined  by t h e  
r equ i r emen t  
( i i i )  If one h a s  t o  e v a l u a t e  an i n e f f i c i e n t  e x p e r i m e n t ,  
t h e n  p r o p o s i t i o n  2 . 2 . 1  g i v e s  an upperbound f o r  t h e  
EVI. ( I n  t h i s  s e n s e  i t  i s  an improvement o v e r  t h e  
w e l l  known i n e q u a l i t y  EVI 5 EVPI ( p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n )  
Th i s  upperbound may b e  d e r i v e d  w i t h  l e s s  computa t ion  
t h a n  t h e  EVI: t h e  b ranches  such  t h a t  P,EP 
E - Eel 
need n o t  be  e v a l u a t e d ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  example 
1 . 4 . 3  i n  4 ,  t h e  exper iment  i s  i n e f f i c i e n t  s i n c e  
Pz E P E Z  and i t  may be seen  t h a t  2  1 , ~ 3 1 '  
Max 1 A u * ( p  ) = 2 u* ( p Z -  ) + 1 u*(pz  = 3 5 - 8 3  
X E A  z  z  1 6  3  
whereas  t h e  a c t u a l  EVI i s  25.25 and EVPI i s  7 0 ) .  Then 
t h e  knowledge o f  a n  upperbound f o r  t h e  EVI may 
e n a b l e  t h e  a n a l y s t  t o  c u t  o f f  some b ranch  i n  a 
d e c i s i o n  t r e e .  
References  
L-11 Blackwe l l ,  D.  and G i r s h i c k ,  M . A .  Theory o f  Games 
and S t a t i s t i c a l  D e c i s i o n s .  Wiley,  1954. 
[2] Howard, R . A .  " In fo rma t ion  Value Theory.  " IEEE Trans .  
on Systems Sc i ence  and C y b e r n e t i c s ,  Vol .  SSC-4, 
June 1967, p p .  54-60. 
[31 R a i f f a ,  H .  Dec i s ion  A n a l y s i s ,  I n t r o d u c t o r y  L e c t u r e s .  
Addison-Wes l e y ,  1967. 
[4] R a i f f a ,  H .  and S c h l a i f e r ,  R .  Appl ied  S t a t i s t i c a l  
D e c i s i o n  Theory.  M . 1  .T. P r e s s ,  A p r i l  1968. 
[5] S a v a g e , L . J .  F o u n d a t i o n s o f S t a t i s t i c s .  Wiley,  1954. 
